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Abstract 
This paper describes the relation between fertility and intergenerational child-care support provided by grandparents in 
a model based on the overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Results show that intergenerational 
child-care support causes fertility to fluctuate. This paper presents an alternative model of fluctuating fertility shown 
by the `Easterlin Hypothesis' described by Benhabib and Nishimura (1989), and others. Moreover, this paper shows 
that an increase in rewards for child care supplied by older people does not always increase child care. Consequently, 
younger people can not depend on sufficient intergenerational child-care support. 
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     1 Introduction
Intergenerational cooperation is often observed in families. Parents (or grandparents) as-
sist in child care and household tasks. The children (parents) provide nancial support to
their parents (grandparents), as described by Schultz (1988) and others. Such intergen-
erational cooperation can ease the burden of child care and promote the upbringing of a
child. In fact, the fertility of nuclear families is less than that of three-generation families
in Japan1, which implies that the family type is one factor determining the fertility rate
in a family. Even if parents have their children, the parents can work suciently thanks
to the grandparents' eorts. They (older parents) do housekeeping or care for children in
place of the parents (younger parents).
This paper establishes an overlapping generations model with intergenerational coop-
eration and presents the relation between fertility and intergenerational child-care support.
Moreover, this paper considers gifts from children (younger people) to parents (older peo-
ple). Zhang and Zhang (1998) consider an endogenous fertility model with introduced
gifts. The gift incorporated by Zhang and Zhang (1998) is included with the stipulation
that parents must do something to receive a gift. However, the gift considered herein is
that the parents must do housekeeping or child care to receive the gift.
The `Easterlin Hypothesis' suggests the possibility of self-generating uctuations in
population growth: baby booms and baby busts are repeated. A large population will
face stier economic competition, lower incomes, congestion, and crowding if other means
of production as well as the social infrastructure do not expand simultaneously. The
result might be a decline in fertility levels as parents attempt to maintain an adequate
standard of living for themselves. Moreover, using the framework developed by Barro and
Becker (1989), Benhabib and Nishimura (1989) demonstrate that the fertility rate might
uctuate according to capital per capita. Our paper presents an alternative mechanism
of fertility rate uctuation by incorporating intergenerational child-care support. This
paper shows that intergenerational cooperation produces the uctuation of the fertility
rate and that whether uctuation converges or not is determined intergenerationally by
1This fact was uncovered using a survey conducted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transport (2002).
1relative altruism. Moreover, even if younger people increase the gift for their parents to
induce the housekeeping or child-care time supplied by their parents, the parents reduce
the housekeeping or child-care time in a steady state. Consequently, fertility might also
decrease. Intergenerational child-care support is fundamentally equal to the child-care ser-
vice supplied by nursery schools and other facilities. Apps and Rees (2004) and Mart nez
and Iza (2004) consider the child-care sector and show that fertility increases thanks to
the child-care service because the opportunity cost for child bearing and subsequent care
decreases. Galor and Weil (1996) present a model in which an increase in the wage rate
increases the opportunity cost for child care. Thereby, fertility decreases.2 Then, child-
care services can stop decreasing fertility. On the other hand, this paper describes that
even if younger people increase the gift as the reward for child care to increase intergen-
erational child care, the child-care support supplied by older people does not increase as
younger people might expect. Consequently, younger people must not and do not depend
on sucient intergenerational child care.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the next section, we describe intergen-
erational cooperation and develop an overlapping generation model with cooperation. In
section 3, we show that uctuation of the fertility rate can be a result of relative altru-
ism. In section 4, we prove a relation between intergenerational child-care support and
altruism. Finally, we conclude the paper.
2 The Model
We consider the most popular overlapping generations (OLG) framework, which subsumes
that each agent lives for only two periods. We regard the cohort that is born at t   1 as
generation t; agents of this generation are young in period t and older in period t + 1.
At each point in time, two generations exist: young and old generations. The lifetime of
2Galor and Weil (1996) present a model in which the relation between the fertility and the income per
capita (wage rate) is negative. However, Groezen, Leers, and Meijdam (2003) and Fanti and Gori (2009)
present a model for which this relation is positive. In these models, the opportunity cost for child care
is not considered explicitly. Fertility is characterized as increasing because of an income eect. Groezen,
Leers, and Meijdam (2003) consider an overlapping generations model based on the small open economy
hypothesis by which individuals draw utility from the number of children raised and consumption at both
younger and older times. On the other hand, Fanti and Gori (2009) consider an overlapping generations
model of a closed economy.
2agents of a generation is t. All agents are assumed to have an identical utility function,
which depends on the number of children in the young period and which depends on
consumption and leisure during the older period. Therefore, we assume that the utility
function ut is the following.3
ut = lnnt + lnct+1 + (1      )lnlt+1; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  < 1 (1)
Therein, nt is the number of children of generation t in the young period, and ct+1, lt+1
represents the consumption and leisure of this generation in the old period.
Next, we consider the economic behavior of each agent of generation t. They are
endowed with a unit of time for both their young and old periods. In the young period
t, they decide on labor times and the number of children they have nt. That is to say,
they divide a unit of time between the labor supply and their child rearing. Child rearing
requires  units of time per child. Therefore, the time allocated for child rearing and
labor income are denoted, respectively, as nt and (1 nt)wt. The wage rate is denoted
as wt. Consequently, we can obtain the following budget constraint when each agent is
young.
st = (1   nt)wt + zt(wt   h) (2)
In that equation, st denotes the savings of the young in period t. In addition, zt signies
the times of child rearing assistance from the previous generation (old when the period is
t), which is the child-care assistance from their parents. It is dened as 1 lt
nt 1. In addition,
h stands for the reward per unit of support time for the older generation in period t.4
We assume that the child-care time supplied by younger people and the time supplied by
older people are perfect substitutes. Actually, h is not determined through the market;
it depends on mutual negotiation that takes place between the younger and the older
generations. In other words, h denotes the degree of relative altruism in the economy.
Large h implies that the young generation is more (less) altruistic (selsh) than the old
3This assumption is conventional in modeling of endogenous fertility. (Galor and Weil (1996), Groezen,
Leers, and Meijdam (2003), and others.)
4zt is dened by 1 lt
nt 1. Furthermore, nt 1 denotes the number of children the older person has. We
assume that the older people supplies child care equally among all of their children.
3generation. We consider h as a gift from the children (younger people) to parents (older
people). The older people must take care of care children to receive the gift.
Moreover, the magnitude of zt can be interpreted as the time of intergenerational
support in the society. Younger people ask the older people to care for their children
if wt > h. Otherwise, the younger people care for their children by themselves, and
the intergenerational child-care support vanishes. For that reason, we consider the case
in which the intergenerational child care exists: wt > h. To a considerable degree, zt
increases the labor time decreased by the child care. The labor time is shown as 1 nt+zt.
However, the condition 1   nt + zt  1 must hold.
During the older period t + 1, they use their time for leisure and to support their
children's care. Assuming that lt+1 denotes the leisure time of an agent of generation t in
their old period t+1, the reward from child-care assistance for their children is (1 lt+1)h.
Therefore, the budget constraints for each t-generation agent in the old period t + 1 are
ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)st + (1   lt+1)h; (3)
where rt+1 is the interest rate.
Each agent treats wt, rt+1 and zt(= 1 lt
nt 1) as given and chooses nt, ct+1 and lt+1 to






ct+1 = (1 + rt+1)It; (5)
lt+1 =
(1 + rt+1)(1      )
h
It (6)
Therein, Itwt + (wt   h)zt + h
1+rt+1.
Finally, the production function of nal goods is given as a neoclassical constant-
returns-to-scale function Yt = F(Kt;Lt), where Yt denotes the aggregate nal goods, Kt
stands for the aggregate capital stock, and Lt represents the labor input. Assuming perfect
competition and dening f(kt)  Yt
Lt and kt  Kt
Lt, the wage rate wt and the interest rate
rt are shown, respectively, as wt = f(kt)   f0(kt)kt and rt = f0(kt).
5See Appendix A for a detailed proof.
43 Equilibrium
The analyses described in this paper subsume a small open economy. Therefore, the
interest rate, the wage rate, and the capital{labor ratio are constant. Substituting the
optimal allocation of nt into zt+1 =
1 lt+1






w + (w   h)zt + h
1+r
 








Fig. 1 z in a steady state
This equation shows the dynamic change in the degree of intergenerational child-care
support provided by grandparents. If zt is low, then zt+1 is high, and vice versa. A
higher zt produces a high fertility rate. However, in the next period, the support that
households receive declines. Therefore, the fertility rate also decreases. Consequently,
in the subsequent period, this support increases because of the decrease in households,
which increases the fertility rate. This process continues. As a result, zt uctuates over
time, as does the fertility rate. Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 An intergenerational child-care support in a steady state ^ z is unique.
The child-care time per child  is small, zt can converge to ^ z with uctuation. On the
6See Appendix B for a detailed proof.
5other hand, if  is large, then zt can diverge from ^ z with uctuation.
Proof Considering the steady state zt+1 = zt = ^ z, Fig. 1 shows that ^ z is unique. Then,

































Actually, ^ z is locally stable if  1 <
dzt+1
dzt jzt+1=zt=^ z < 0.8 Actually,
dzt+1








w + (w   h)^ z + h
1+r
2: (9)
This stable condition can not be satised if the child-care time per child  is large.9 Then,




7See Appendix C for detailed proof.
8 dzt+1
dzt is always negative. For that reason, we do not consider 0 <
dzt+1
dzt < 1 as a locally stable
condition.







This proposition proves that this paper presents an alternative model with uctuating
fertility shown by the 'Easterlin Hypothesis', as described by Benhabib and Nishimura
(1989), and others.
If the zt that agents in generation t receive is small, then zt+1 increases because of
the agents' supply of additional child-care support to gain more income. However, if
zt is large, then zt+1 decreases because agents spend more time in leisure as a result of
their sucient income. Consequently, zt uctuates over time, as does fertility rate nt. If
the amount of change in zt is equal to that in zt+1, then zt and nt uctuate to innity.
Intergenerational child-care support zt can diverge over time if  is large. The higher 
lowers the fertility rate. Therefore, the child-care support provided by grandparents to
their children is large. This eect increases over time, so divergence occurs.
7From the description provided above, we can explain two interpretations. First, the
people of the older generation, who have insucient income in the younger period are
willing to provide child care to secure resources for their old age. On the other hand,
with sucient income, the older generation enjoys leisure. In Japan, considering that the
old generation|after rapid economic growth|has sucient income, we can infer that the
older generation views provision of child care negatively; for that reason, the fertility rate
is decreasing.
Second, the results presented in this paper show that if an increase in the number
of children nt 1 lowers the intergenerational child-care support per household zt under
constant lt, then it is brought lower to zt after a baby boom (high nt 1). Moreover, we
can advance the following interpretation. After the baby boom (nt 1), too few parents
existed for the number of households. For that reason, the average intergenerational child
care across households is low (that is, low zt).
4 Analysis
This section presents a description of the relation between an increase in the reward for
the child-care support oered by the older generation, denoted as h, and that support
per household in the steady state, denoted as z. Thereby, the following proposition is
established.
Proposition 2 If ^ z < 1
1+r, then the rise in h pulls up ^ z when the price eect in higher
than the income eect. However, if ^ z > 1
1+r, then the rise in h always pulls up ^ z.





















The sign of this equation is ambiguous. The term of
(1+r)(1  )
h2 in the numerator rep-
resents the price eect. The rise in h indicates an increase in the opportunity cost for






2 in the numerator represents the income eect. If ^ z < 1
1+r, then the
rise in h increases households' incomes. Therefore, the leisure and the fertility rate also
rise. Consequently, the income eect in the case of ^ z < 1
1+r decreases ^ z. If the price eect
is higher than the income eect, then the rise in h increases ^ z. However, if ^ z > 1
1+r, then
the sign of ^ z   1
1+r is positive. Therefore, the rise in h always increases ^ z. Q.E.D.
When ^ z < 1
1+r|that is, when the intergenerational child-care support ^ z is small|the
rise in h does not always increase ^ z. We can interpret the reward of child care h as security
in old age or as a gift. This proposition shows that an increase in security in old age does
not always pull up intergenerational child-care support.






1+r   ^ z + (w   h)d^ z
dh

. We obtain d^ n
dh > 0 if ^ z < 1
1+r and d^ z
dh > 0 (the income
eect is small). Therefore, we note that an increase in the gift h does not always increase
fertility: even if younger people consider increasing the gift given to older people for more
care, the older people reduce their care for children. Consequently, fertility decreases also.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented analyses of the relation between fertility and intergenerational
child-care support (child-care support per household oered by older people) based on
the overlapping generations model in which households determine the number of children
(the fertility rate) and child-care support by older people. Among the results that have
been advanced in this paper, the following two are especially noteworthy.
First, if intergenerational support is introduced into the endogenous fertility model,
then the fertility rate uctuates. Furthermore, the breadth of that uctuation is deter-
mined by the relevant parameter (e.g. care time per child).
Second, a rise in the degree of relative altruism (or security or gift in old age) does
not always increase the fertility rate and child care supplied by older people. Therefore,
older people do not supply child care to the degree that younger people expect.
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10Appendix A
The Lagrange function is set as shown below:
L  lnnt +  lnct+1 + (1      )lnlt+1;
+ 

wt(1 + zt   nt)   hzt +
h
1 + rt+1
































= wt(1 + zt   nt)   hzt +
h
1 + rt+1




Substituting (A.1){(A.3) into (A.4), we obtain  = 1
wt+(wt h)zt+ h
1+rt+1
. By substituting 
into (A.1){(A.3), optimal allocations (4){(6) are shown.
Appendix B
We can depict Fig. 1 if
dzt+1
dzt < 0 and
@2zt+1
@z2





















w + (w   h)zt + h
1+r
3 > 0





h > 0; that is,
h >
(1      )(1 + r)w
 + 
:
Consequently, h must be in
(1  )(1+r)w
+ < h < w. Unless this condition holds, zt+1
becomes negative. (Then, no steady state of ^ z > 0 exists.) The grandparents take their
11time and use it as leisure time if zt+1 or zt or ^ z is negative. Our paper is intended to
present analyses of intergenerational child care by which the grandparents give their time.
Therefore, we do not consider such a case.
Appendix C






w + (w   h)^ z + h
1+r
 
(1 + r)(1      )
h
!
With some calculation, we obtain the following equation.































> 0 if ^ z > 0 or h >
(1  )(1+r)w
+ . The locus of the




Left Side of (C.1)
Fig. 3 Solution of (C.1)
This equation has two solutions as ^ z: one for negative value ^ z0 and the other for
positive value ^ z1. However, because ^ z must be positive, ^ z is determined uniquely as ^ z1.
Actually, ^ z1 is shown as (8).
12Appendix D











w + (w   h)^ z + h
1+r
 <























w(w   h)(1 + r)(1      )
:
13